Non Election

The euphoria following the January 30, 2005, Iraqi election was misplaced. The pre-election suicide bombing in the mess hall on the U.S. military base outside Mosul that killed 24 people and left hundreds wounded was the first warning shot that the election for a 275- member constitutional assembly was a non-starter. The mortar attacks on the fortified Green Zone compound during the inauguration of the new National Assembly, was the opening salvo of the looming civil war. The chaotic pandemonium of the second session in March 2005, that became a secret session after journalists were forcibly evicted, was the unofficial start of the civil war.

The election of Sunni Hajem al-Hassani as speaker, a few hours after 40-60 insurgents mounted a daring suicide assault on Abu Ghraib that wounded 44 U.S. troops, was the clarion call how futile the election was.

The election should have been delayed for at least six months to allow time to mitigate the alienation and sense of occupation felt by many Iraqis, especially by the marginalized Sunni-led insurgents. Hopes for a rebuilt democratic nation were overwhelmed by fear and violent carnage, rendering the election meaningless to most Iraqis because they are more concerned about the lack of kerosene for cooking, electricity and gasoline to drive their vehicles. The posters said it all. “We don’t want elections,” one read. “We want electricity”.

In oil-rich Iraq it is only logical that as long as there is a fuel crisis an election is irrelevant. Why not delay it until after the energy crisis is solved?

The election that once looked like it might produce a government with nationwide legitimacy increasingly intensified divisions between the obvious beneficiaries – the Shiites and Kurds – and the estranged Saddam Hussein Sunnis who knew they had nothing to gain by going to the polls except violence or death. By delaying the election several months, the U.S. could have attracted greater Sunni participation. Without broad participation by all Iraqi groups, the election had little chance of producing a legitimate government that could survive without U.S. military support. The election only accelerates another failed state similar to warlord Somalia from which the U.S. peace force was expelled. “Each political party has its own armed militia, the country is in the hands of gangs,” Hasni Abidi, an Iraqi analyst, said, adding that Baghdad’s fortified Green Zone showed “the transfer of sovereignty was illusory”.

With a majority of people in America on the eve of the Iraqi election saying the war was a mistake, wouldn’t it have made sense to delay the election until civil order was restored?

Going ahead with the election with pronouncements that the election will lead to peace because 14 of Iraq’s 18 provinces appeared “relatively calm”, while Baghdad and the three other Sunni provinces are mired by the Sunni dominated insurgency, was shortsighted. Sunnis willing to run for office or willing to work with the government do not have the backing of the Sunni population. The Sunnis elected to the parliament do not have the standing in the Sunni community necessary to force acceptance of the government on the people.

The resentment by Sunnis started with their wholesale dismissal from the military and government positions and accelerated with the physical destruction of their communities in Fallujah and Mosul. A coalition of Sunni political leaders led by Adnan Pachachi, a respected moderate, repeatedly called for the postponing of the January election to allow time for broader participation. His pleas were ignored. Instead President Bush reiterated his “revolutionary” foreign policy and the “job” of the U.S. and those who wanted peace was to “be aggressive in the spread of freedom”. Aggressive behavior is not free. It is very costly in human lives and the future angry generations it spawns.

Osama bin Laden, a Sunni himself, released a video prior to the election urging the Iraqi people to boycott the election. The biggest Sunni party withdrew from the elections alltogether. Estimates put Sunni participation at 25 percent. Many Sunnis that braved the violence to go to the polls were turned away because there were not enough ballots. In other cases some polls in Sunni strongholds did not even bother to open. The low Sunni turnout does raise legitimate questions about the credibility of the election.

Forcing premature elections will not bring democracy or stability to Iraq. The U.S. could not ensure the safety of Iraqis who wanted to go to one of the 5,500 polling stations, which for security reasons were disclosed only at the last minute. America could not even protect its own having lunch in a mess hall on a military base! The Bush White House was told it was losing the battle against the insurgents and that the U.S. forces can’t stop the pre-election intimidation of prospective voters and polling officials.

Most of the electorate believed they were voting for a president, not a constitutional assembly. The ongoing violence not only prevented the 7,700 candidates running from campaigning, but from announcing their names until the ballots were handed out for fear of being assassinated.

The inevitable result was that a Sunni minority overwhelmed by a Shiite and Kurdish majority launched even more violent attacks that now require even more U.S. and coalition troops to quell. Sabotage and attacks by insurgents still average 50 a day over six months after the election. “The situation in Iraq is getting worse,” Iraq-born Mustafa Alani, who observes the region from the Gulf Research Centre in the United Arab Emirates, said several months after the election. “The attacks on police and security forces are nonstop and this is not a good sign. Security is a key – there can be no political stability or economic progress without security.” The election not only destabilized Iraq, but has the potential to destabilize Syria, Lebanon, Egypt and other neighbors.

The election of a constitutional assembly was supposed to be the first building block for a stable democratic Iraq. It was to be the key to U.S. strategy in Iraq. How could the key open the door to a truly democratic Iraq if a religious group boycotts the election because it feels marginalized?

Out of a population of 25 million and more than 230 political parties and groups, 15.2 million, including 1.2 million living abroad, were eligible to vote of which 14 million registered to vote. Only an estimated eight and a half million turned out, which gave the Shiites a predominant majority in the parliament. The Shiites received 48 percent of the vote -- the first Shiite dominated government in an Arab country in 11 centuries.