Monday, May 30, 2005

Shock and Awe Urban War

Hong Kong, May 30. The American and Iraqi public were conditioned by Pentagon spinners before the Iraqi War started that the unprecedented bombing raids on Iraq in the opening days of the war would “shock and awe” the Iraqis to surrender en masse and greet the coalition liberators with open arms, flowers and smiles. Bush spinners privately said the war might last only two or three weeks. On the opening night of the war, they took a chance on winning the war in a single night by striking at a Baghdad compound where Saddam Hussein and his sons were believed to be staying. In fact it was the Pentagon that was in shock and awed by the tough and fierce resistance the Iraqis initially put up. Marines were down to one meal a day because of guerrilla and suicide attacks that created logistical chaos and delayed the arrival of the supply convoys from the rear. Something the military planners overlooked.

Sand storms and unexpected traffic jams on the main highways made the job easier for the suicide bombers. The war required twice the number of U.S. troops than were planned for, took longer and was more costly than most Americans expected because of how we were conditioned by the war spinners and the phony rigged war games planned and played by the Pentagon. “There is a realization that we came in a little light,” an officer told his troops. “It was hubris to go on Fox News and proclaim the war would be a cakewalk,” a former aide to the first president Bush said. “The gods were bound to hear it.”

“The enemy we’re fighting is different from the one we war-gamed against,” Lieutenant General William Wallace said. They were aware of the fierce loyalty of the Iraqi militia to Saddam Hussein, “but we did not know how they would fight.” Why not? The CIA analysts had warned the Pentagon about the threat of the paramilitary units but the Bushies at the Pentagon decided not to fully brief the commanders in the field. Any wonder they were caught by surprise? “We misjudged their tenacity,” a senior U.S. intelligence official says of Iraqi leaders. “These guys are driven by a hatred (toward the United States) that we may have underestimated.” What an understatement. The Pentagon was convinced the Iraqi generals would capitulate and surrender. “Our intelligence assessments were overly optimistic,” a senior U.S. military official says. “They were simply wrong.”

During World War I after the British liberated the Iraqis from the Ottoman Empire, the Iraqis slaughtered tens of thousands of British soldiers who marched into Iraq expecting the same hero’s welcome the coalition forces expected for liberating the country. After the way the first Bush administration let them down in 1991 when they heeded his call to rise up and overthrow Saddam that resulted in their own massacre, is it any wonder they are going to be cautious the second time around? When is America going to learn? Why not do it right the first time? Why expect people to risk their lives after they were betrayed the first time around? No spin can change this basic human survival instinct.

The urban war America got sucked into in Baghdad and other Iraqi cities was not supposed to happen, according to the Pentagon game plan. But then again, when you spin fake outcomes to war games why should we be surprised? From Stalingrad in World War II, to the U.S. Marine assault on Hue, Vietnam, in 1968 during the Tet offensive and to Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1993, when sophisticated Black Hawk helicopters were brought down by primitive shoulder-fired rocket-propelled grenades, urban warfare has always shocked and awed the superior invading army.

Central Command chief General John Abizaid, who succeeded General Tommy Franks, said the Iraqis “are conducting what I would describe as a classical guerrilla-type campaign against us. It’s low-intensity conflict in our doctrinal terms, but it’s war however you describe it…The level of resistance…is getting more organized and it is learning.” The general’s comments contradicted Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who said five weeks earlier that it was not “anything like a guerrilla war or an organized resistance”. With average daily losses of more than one U.S. soldier’s life in Iraq since President Bush declared victory and an end to major hostilities on May 1, 2003, his announcement clearly rings just as empty and hollow as the flyboy suit he wore.

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