Iran Denuclearization

The recently failed Iran denuclearization talks in Geneva should come as no surprise and should nevertheless be viewed as a positive step that Iran is prepared to freeze its uranium-enrichment activities as part of broader negotiations which include Iran’s right to develop nuclear power and the cessation of covert U.S. military activities in Iran.

Objective intelligence reports claim that the U.S. data on Iran, like Iraq, is flawed. America’s evidence on Iran’s nuclear plans and programs remains ambiguous, fragmented and difficult to prove. One thing certain is that the U.S. has been trying to undermine the Islamic Revolution since 1979. The Iranian regime’s fragile sense of legitimacy necessitates dealing with it respectfully.

Negotiating with Iran is essential if there is to be a rapprochement between the two global powers. The arguments made against negotiating with Iran were also made against negotiating with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Soviet misconduct easily matches that of Iran in aggression, oppression, murder, support of terrorist groups and mendacity.

President Reagan challenged Soviet behavior by supporting groups fighting communist intervention, building the military, strengthening NATO, condemning human-rights violations, and conveying the message of freedom in every way possible. Nevertheless, negotiations took place with four specific policies in place, including: Regime Acceptance ─ which required the U.S. to refrain from activities aimed at destroying the Soviet regime it was trying to influence, while vigorously denouncing its political and moral legitimacy; Limited Linkage ─ Negotiations on human rights, arms control, regional issues and bilateral relations were pursued without linkage to Soviet conduct, enabling negotiations to proceed while the U.S. responded firmly through deeds; Rhetorical Restraint ─ Reagan vigorously criticized the Soviet system and its behavior, but promised not to “crow” when the Soviets agreed to U.S. proposals, enabling Soviet leaders to avoid being seen as capitulating to U.S. demands; and Self-Interest ─ U.S. negotiating policy was based on convincing the Soviets to act in their own best interests.
Why can’t these same principles be applied to Iran?